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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Vernon Craig Pelland appeals from the judgment of conviction entered 
upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of grand theft by possession and from the 
district court's order relinquishing jurisdiction. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In June 2013, Garden City Police Officer Tim Riley arrested Pelland on an 
outstanding misdemeanor warrant near the Veteran's Memorial Parkway bridge 
in Boise. (Trial Tr., p.205, Ls.22-25; p.208, L.9 - p.211, L.16.) At the time of his 
contact with Office Riley, Pelland possessed a shopping cart full of property. 
(Trial Tr., p.209, Ls.13-25.) Officer Riley took custody of the property for 
safekeeping in the Garden City Police Department evidence room. (Trial Tr., 
p.213, Ls.4-11.) 
Later, Officer Riley and another officer took inventory of the items from 
Pelland's shopping cart. (Trial Tr., p.214, L.17 - p.215, L.15.) The officers 
recovered several identification cards that did not belong to Pelland and a box 
containing several hundred blank MoneyGram money orders. (Trial Tr., p.216, 
L.3 - p.226, L.22; see also State's Exhibits 1-8.) 
Several days later, Garden City Police Officer John Brumbaugh 
interviewed Pelland at the Ada County Jail about the identification cards and 
blank money orders. (Trial Tr., p.295, L.10 - p.296, L.23; State's Exhibit 9.) 
Pelland admitted that he knew that the blank money orders were in the shopping 
cart. (State's Exhibit 9, 2:45 - 3:10; see also Trial Tr., p.325, L.24 - p.327, L.22.) 
1 
Pelland told Officer Brumbaugh that he had taken the money orders after his 
girlfriend left them behind when she moved away from the motel room they were 
living in. (State's Exhibit 9, 2:14 - 3:35; 6:38 - 6:55.) 
The state charged Pelland with grand theft by possession (for the blank 
money orders) and misdemeanor petit theft (for the identification cards). (R., 
pp.63-64.) After a trial, the jury found Pelland guilty of both charges. (R., pp.98-
99.) On the date of the sentencing hearing, the district court dismissed the 
misdemeanor petit theft charge. 1 (R., pp.100-101.) The court then imposed a 
unified 10-year sentence with two years fixed for grand theft by possession, but 
retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.104-107.) 
At the conclusion of the period of retained jurisdiction, the Idaho 
Department of Correction recommended that the district court relinquish 
jurisdiction due to Pelland's failure to complete required programing. (PSI, 
p.101. 2 ) The district court relinquished jurisdiction and ordered its original 
sentence executed. (R., pp.132-134.) Pelland filed timely notices of appeal from 
both the judgment of conviction and the district court's order relinquishing 
1 The district court's dismissal order does not contain a reason for the dismissal, 
and the appellate record does not contain a transcript of the sentencing hearing 
at which the charge was dismissed. (See R., pp.100-101.) However, after the 
jury returned its verdicts, the district court stated that it had "some concerns 
about the state of the evidence vis-a-vis Count II" (the misdemeanor petit theft 
charge), and that it might consider dismissal of that charge. (Trial Tr., p.407, 
Ls.15-25.) 
2 "PSI" page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file 
"Pelland 42554 psi.pdf." This file contains Pelland's presentence investigation 
report, amended presentence investigation reports, and other documents 
associated with the underlying case. 
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jurisdiction. (R., pp.109-113, 135-137.) The Idaho Supreme Court consolidated 
these cases for appeal. (3/5/15 Order.) 
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ISSUES 
Pelland states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Should this Court vacate Mr. Pelland's conviction for grand 
theft by possession because there was insufficient evidence 
to support the conviction? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished 
jurisdiction? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1 . Has Pelland failed to show that the evidence presented was insufficient to 
support his conviction for grand theft by possession? 
2. Has Pelland failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing 
discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Pelland Has Failed To Show That The Evidence Presented Was Insufficient To 
Support His Conviction For Grand Theft By Possession 
A. Introduction 
Pelland contends that the state presented insufficient evidence to support 
his conviction for grand theft by possession. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-10) 
Specifically, Pelland contends that the state presented insufficient evidence to 
prove: (1) that the blank money orders were "money orders" pursuant to the 
language of the relevant statute and jury instruction; and (2) that the money 
orders were actually stolen. (Id.) A review of the record reveals that the state 
presented substantial competent evidence from which a rational trier of fact could 
conclude that Pelland committed grand theft by possessing stolen money orders. 
B. Standard Of Review 
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon 
a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact 
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt. State v. Miller, 131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); 
State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Hart, 112 
Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). In conducting this review 
the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the 
credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 
607; State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101,822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); Hart, 112 
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Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d at 1072. Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn 
from those facts, are construed in favor of upholding the jury's verdict. Miller, 131 
Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d at 1072. 
Questions of statutory interpretation are given free review. State v. 
Maidwell, 137 Idaho 424, 426, 50 P.3d 439, 441 (2002). 
C. The Evidence Presented Was Sufficient To Support Pelland's Conviction 
For Grand Theft By Possession 
In this case, the state presented substantial competent evidence from 
which a rational fact-finder could conclude both that the blank money orders were 
"money orders" within the meaning of the relevant jury instruction and I.C. § 18-
2407(1 )(b)(3), and that the blank money orders were, in fact, stolen. 
1. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence That The Blank Money 
Orders Possessed By Pelland Were "Money Orders" 
Idaho Code § 18-2407(1 )(b)(3) provides that an individual commits felony 
grand theft where he commits a theft of property as provided by Idaho law, and 
when. that property consists of an "order for the payment of money upon any 
bank." In this case, consistent with this statute, the jury was instructed that in 
order to find Pelland guilty of felony grand theft by possession as charged, the 
state was required to prove that Pelland "obtained, possessed, and/or withheld 
money orders." (R., p.77.) 
It is axiomatic and long-established that a statute will be interpreted 
according to its plain language and that where the language is plain the court will 
not resort to principles of statutory construction. State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 
360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003); State v. McCoy, 128 Idaho 362, 365, 913 P.2d 
6 
578, 581 (1996). "When a statute is unambiguous, it must be interpreted in 
accordance with its language, courts must follow it as enacted, and a reviewing 
court may not apply rules of construction." State v. Wiedmeier, 121 Idaho 189, 
191, 824 P.2d 120, 122 (1992) (citations omitted). In Verska v. Saint Alphonsus 
Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 894-896, 265 P.3d 502, 507-509 
(2011), the Idaho Supreme Court held that Idaho appellate courts do not have the 
authority to modify unambiguous statutes even when construing the statute as 
written would produce "absurd results." 
When a statute is ambiguous, it must be construed to mean what the 
legislature intended it to mean. State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 
732 (2009). To determine that intent, the appellate court examines not only the 
literal words of the statute, but also the reasonableness of the proposed 
constructions, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative history. ~ 
In determining the ordinary meaning of a statute "effect must be given to all the 
words of the statute if possible, so that none will be void, superfluous, or 
redundant." State v. Mercer, 143 Idaho 108, 109, 138 P.3d 308,309 (2006). 
The relevant jury instruction and I.C. § 18-2407(1 )(b) utilize, respectively, 
the broad terms of "money order" and "order for the payment of money upon any 
bank." (R., p.77.) The plain meaning of these terms is inclusive and 
contemplates all types of money orders. Much like a blank check is a type of 
check, a blank money order is a type of money order. The broad and inclusive 
language provided by I.C. § 18-2407(1 )(b)(3) and the relevant jury instruction 
does not exclude blank money orders, or blank checks, from its purview. 
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On appeal, Pelland compares the blank money orders he possessed to 
"the piece of plastic upon which a credit card is ultimately printed or the printer 
paper upon which a traveler's check is printed." (Appellant's brief, p.9.) 
Pelland's comparison is misguided. Unlike a blank money order or a blank 
check, a mere piece of plastic or page of printed paper upon which a credit card 
or traveler's check may someday be printed does not contain any of the features 
or characteristics that an ordinary person would associate with a "credit card" or 
"traveler's check." To the contrary, the blank money orders possessed by Pelland 
had the term "money order" printed directly on them, and contained many of the 
commonly-known features of money orders, such as a serial number, the name 
of the money order company, the name of the bank upon which the money order 
is paid, and visible authentication and security features. (State's Exhibit 8.) In 
this way, blank money orders are more similar to credit cards issued by a bank 
that have not yet been activated by the consumer than they are to raw pieces of 
plastic which have not yet been imprinted with credit card information. For these 
reasons, a blank money order is an "order for the payment of money upon any 
bank" within the plain meaning of I.C. § 18-2407(1 )(b)(3), just like blank checks 
or unactivated credit cards are "checks" and "credit cards," respectively, within 
the plain meaning of that same subsection. 
Further, to the extent that I.C. § 18-2407(1 )(b )(3) and/or the relevant jury 
instruction are ambiguous with regard to whether blank money orders are 
"money orders," an analysis of the legislative intent behind the statute reveals 
that the legislature intended to include a broad range of financial instruments, 
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including blank money orders, in the I.C. § 18-2407(1)(b)(3) list of property 
covered by the grand theft statute. 
Idaho Code§ 18-2407(1)(b) provides numerous scenarios under which an 
individual who commits theft may be charged with felony grand theft. Prior to 
2002, I.C. § 18-2407(1 )(b)(3) provided that an individual who commits theft 
commits felony grand theft where the stolen property "consists of a credit card." 
See 2002 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 326, § 1, p.917. In 2002, the Idaho legislature 
broadened I.C. § 18-2407(1 )(b)(3) to include numerous additional financial 
instruments. ]st The amended subsection provides that "[a] person is guilty of 
grand theft when he commits a theft as defined in this chapter" and when: 
The property consists of a check, draft or order for the payment of 
money upon any bank, or a check, draft or order account number, 
or a financial transaction card or financial transaction card account 
number as those terms are defined in section 18-3122, Idaho 
Code[.] 
I.C. § 18-2407(1 )(b)(3). 
The legislature's Statement of Purpose for this amendment provided: 
[T]he bill aims to include theft of checks or checking account num-
bers under the grand theft statute. Currently under Idaho Law, theft 
of checks would only amount to a misdemeanor in light of the fact 
that the actual value of checks themselves is under $1000.00. This 
legislation aims to increase the penalty for the theft of checks 
and/or checking account numbers to a felony. 
In recent years Idaho has seen a large increase in the theft 
and misuse of checks, financial transaction cards and/or just the 
associated account numbers. This legislation's intent is to address 
this type of theft and prevent the huge losses, which invariably oc-
cur when the thieves fraudulently use, sell or pass on to others the 
stolen checks, financial transaction cards or account numbers. 
Statement of Purpose, RS 12157, S.S. 1495 (2002). 
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In light of the legislature's concern regarding the "huge losses" which 
"invariably occur" when financial instruments are stolen, there is no reason why 
the legislature would have intended to exclude blank money orders from the 
language of this subsection. As William Hart, MoneyGram's Director of Global 
Security and Investigations testified at Pelland's trial, the potential scope of fraud 
from the theft of blank money orders exceeds the potential scope of fraud from 
the theft of filled-in money orders. As Hart explained, this is because an 
individual who stole blank money orders could type any amount up to the 
maximum $900 limit for MoneyGram money orders and successfully obtain 
payment from individuals who may not be familiar with the security features of 
the order. (Trial Tr., p.256, L.5 - p.257, L.25; p.260, L.21 - p.263, L.23; p.267, 
L.22 - p.268, L.19.) Hart testified that this type of fraud has been committed with 
MoneyGram money orders. (Trial Tr., p.262, Ls.19-23.) 
A blank money order is an "order for the payment of money upon any 
bank" within the plain meaning of I.C. § 18-2407(1 )(b)(3). Further, to the extent 
that I. C. § 18-2407( 1 )(b )(3) is ambiguous, an analysis of the legislative intent 
behind the statute reveals that the legislature intended to include blank money 
orders in this language. Therefore, the state presented substantial competent 
evidence from which a rational fact-finder could conclude that the blank money 
orders possessed by Pelland were money orders. 
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2. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence That The Blank Money 
Orders Possessed By Pelland Were, In Fact, Stolen 
Idaho Code § 18-2403(4) provides that a person commits theft when he 
possesses stolen property he knows to have been stolen or under such 
circumstances as would reasonably induce him to believe the property was 
stolen. In this case, consistent with this statute, the jury was instructed that the 
state must prove that the blank money orders were "in fact stolen." (R., p.77.) A 
review of the record reveals that the state presented substantial competent 
evidence from which a rational fact-finder could conclude that the blank money 
orders possessed by Pelland were in fact stolen. 
MoneyGram employee William Hart testified that the blank money orders 
possessed by Pelland were flagged and reported as "lost or stolen" by Ace Cash 
Express, the authorized agent for the orders. (Trial Tr., p.266, Ls.16-25.) On 
appeal, Pelland emphasizes that Hart's testimony "only established that the 
[blank money orders] were lost or stolen." (Appellant's brief, p.9 (emphasis in 
original).) However, a reasonable jury could infer from circumstances 
surrounding Pelland's possession of the blank money orders that the orders 
were, in fact, stolen. 
Blank money orders are not an ordinary consumer good that can be 
lawfully acquired or obtained by private individuals without authorization. Hart 
testified that the blank money orders are provided directly from MoneyGram to 
authorized agents who have passed background checks, and that the blank 
orders should only be possessed by authorized MoneyGram agents or 
employees. (Trial Tr., p.258, L.5 - p.259, L.5; p.265, L.17 - p.266, L.8; p.273, L.8 
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- p.274, L.1 O; p.287, L.19 - p.288, L.11.) Hart further explained how easily 
unauthorized possession of the blank money orders could result in fraud. (Trial 
Tr., p.256, L.5 - p.257, L.25; p.260, L.21 - p.263, L.23; p.267, L.22 - p.268, 
L.19.) According to this testimony, there is no lawful means by which an 
unauthorized individual, such as Pelland's girlfriend, could have acquired the 
blank money orders. Further, in the police interview that was admitted into 
evidence, Pelland told Officer Brumbaugh that his girlfriend had found the blank 
money orders on the premises of a Las Vegas grocery store which had closed 
down. (Exhibit 9, 5:05 - 5:50.) The jury could have reasonably inferred from this 
evidence that the blank money orders were "stolen" from the store by Pelland's 
girlfriend, within meaning of that term as utilized in the relevant jury instruction, 
and that Pellland, in turn, knew or should have reasonably known that the money 
orders were stolen.3 
Finally, Pelland made statements to Officer Brumbaugh and to the jury at 
trial which indicated that he understood that he should not have possessed the 
blank money orders. Pelland told Officer Brumbaugh that he was mad at his 
girlfriend when he found out "what she did" (i.e., that she took the blank money 
orders). (State's Exhibit 9, 7:48 - 8:05.) Pelland testified that he knew that his 
girlfriend should not have possessed the blank money orders and that he 
3 Even if the jury inferred that the blank money orders had been "lost" at the 
grocery store by Ace Cash Express, an issue that Pelland did not attempt to raise 
during the trial, I.C. § 18-2403(2)(c) provides that an individual who "acquires lost 
property" commits theft when he knows the property to have been lost, knows the 
identity of the owner of the property, fails to take reasonable measures to restore 
the property to the owner, and intends to deprive the owner permanently of the 
property. 
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contacted his girlfriend's parents about the situation. (Trial Tr., p.335, L.17 -
p.336, L.1.) A rational jury could infer from the evidence describing these 
circumstances of Pelland's possession of the blank money orders that the orders 
were, in fact, stolen. 
Sufficient competent evidence was presented at trial whereby a rational 
fact-finder could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Pelland committed 
grand theft by possession by knowingly possessing blank money orders that 
were, in fact, stolen. This Court should therefore affirm Pelland's conviction. 
11. 
Pelland Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion By Relinquishing Jurisdiction 
A. Introduction 
Pelland contends that the district court abused its discretion when it 
relinquished jurisdiction and executed his original sentence. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.10-11.) However, because Pelland has failed to establish an abuse of 
discretion, this Court must affirm the district court's sentencing determination. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. 
Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland, 
125 Idaho 499, 873 P.2d 144 (1994)). 
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C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion In 
Relinquishing Jurisdiction 
The decision to relinquish jurisdiction is a matter within the sound 
discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse 
of that discretion. See State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 711,712,639 P.2d 9, 10 (1981); 
State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1990). A 
court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse of 
discretion if the trial court has sufficient information to determine that a 
suspended sentence and probation would be inappropriate under I.C. § 19-2521. 
State v. Chapel, 107 Idaho 193, 194, 687 P.2d 583, 584 (Ct. App. 1984 ). 
In this case, at the conclusion of the period of retained jurisdiction, the 
district court elected to relinquish jurisdiction and execute its originally imposed 
sentence. (R., pp.132-134; 1/26/15 Tr., p.6, L.16 - p.7, L.22; p.11, L.4 - p.12, 
L.1.) In making this determination, the district court referenced Pelland's poor 
rider performance, criminal history, and risk to-reoffend. (1/26/15 Tr., p.6, L.13 -
p.7, L.22; p.11, L.4- p.12, L.1.) A review of the record supports the district 
court's determination. 
Pelland did not effectively take advantage of the opportunity given to him 
by the district court to participate in retained jurisdiction programming. The APSI 
reflects that Pelland "started his program by making negative statements about 
the justice system and programming," and that during orientation Pelland stated 
that he was "a victim of the system and his judge." (PSI, p.103.) It took almost 
two months for Pelland to "stop making victim statements and start looking at his 
part in his incarceration." (PSI, p.104.) 
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While Pelland's rehabilitative efforts improved after several months in 
custody, Pelland was then removed from programming after he received a 
disciplinary sanction for willingly engaging in mutual combat with another inmate. 
(PSI, pp.103, 105.) Pelland both sustained and inflicted minor injuries during the 
incident. (PSI, p.103.) Following this incident, the Department of Correction 
concluded that Pelland's "actions were dangerous" and that he was "not ready to 
make lasting changes and self[-]regulate at the level required." (PSI, p.105.) 
The district court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction and to execute its 
originally imposed sentence is also supported by factors considered by the court 
in its original sentencing determination. Pelland has a significant prior criminal 
history. He has been charged with misdemeanor domestic battery twice. (PSI, 
pp.4-5.) The first domestic violence charge, in which the victim accused Pelland 
of striking her in the face, pulling a knife, and threatening to cut her, was 
dismissed after Pelland completed community service and counseling 
requirements. (PSI, pp.4-5, 45, 47.) The second domestic violence charge, 
which was brought after Pelland struck his girlfriend in the face with a closed fist, 
resulted in a conviction for misdemeanor domestic battery. (PSI, pp.4-5, 45, 48.) 
In another case, Pelland was charged with simple misdemeanor battery and pied 
guilty to an amended charge of disturbing the peace. (PSI, p.4.) Pelland also 
has misdemeanor convictions for possession of drugs and possession of drug 
paraphernalia. (PSI, p.5.) Additionally, a charge for misdemeanor petit theft was 
dismissed after Pelland was ordered to pay restitution. (PSI, p.4.) 
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Prior to his original sentencing, the presentence investigator observed that 
Pelland "appears to have a history of difficulty controlling his emotions," and "did 
not express remorse for his actions with regard to the instance offense." (PSI, 
pp.16-17.) Pelland was assessed as having a "High Potential for Recidivism" on 
the LSI-R. (PSI, pp.14-16.) Further, while he was incarcerated in the Ada 
County Jail pending his sentencing in the present case, Pelland received a 
disciplinary sanction for attempting to conceal administrated medication in his 
hand rather than taking it. (PSI, pp.7, 32.) 
The district court considered all of the relevant information and reasonably 
decided to relinquish jurisdiction and execute its originally imposed sentence. 
Given any reasonable view of the facts, Pelland has failed to establish that the 
district court abused its discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Pelland's conviction for 
grand theft by possession and the district court's order relinquishing jurisdiction. 
DATED this 3rd day of December, 2015. 
MARK W. OLSON " 
Deputy Attorney General 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 3rd day of December, 2015, served a 
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DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
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Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
MARK W. OLSON \ 
Deputy Attorney General 
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